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I. Laches and "Spoils of War" Doctrine: In re Flamenbaum
The New York Court of Appeals decision in In re Flamenbaum established the elements
of the laches defense to a replevin claim for the recovery of stolen cultural objects and
rejected any "spoils of war" doctrine that would allow a thief to acquire valid title to stolen
property.' A German team of archaeologists conducted excavations in the early part of
the twentieth century at the site of Ashur, located in what is today northern Iraq. Among
finds discovered was a small gold tablet dating to the reign of the Assyrian king Tukulti-
Ninurta 1 (1243 to 1207 BC). The tablet, approximately the size of a modern credit card,
contained an inscription in Assyro-Babylonian written in the Middle Assyrian cuneiform
script.2 The tablet arrived in the Berlin Museum (now the Vorderasiatisches or Near
Eastern Museum) in 1926. The museum was closed during World War II and the objects,
including the gold tablet, were put in storage. At the end of the war, however, the tablet
was missing.
The tablet was next discovered in the estate of Riven Flamenbaum ("the decedent"), a
Holocaust survivor who, at the time of his death in 2003, was a resident of Long Island,
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1. In re Flamenbaum, 899 N.Y.S.2d 546 (2010), rev'd, 945 N.Y.S.2d 183 (App. Div. 2d Dep't. 2012), affd,
22 N.Y.3d 962 (2013). The following description of the facts is taken from the Court of Appeals decision, 22
N.Y. 3d 962, at 963-65.
2. The tablet was published in the excavation report. WALTER ANDRA, DIE JCUNGEREN ISCHTAR-TEM
PEL IN ASSUR 53, pl. 24, p-q (1935). Contrary to the court's description, the tablet was found near the inner
city wall to the north of the Ishtar temple. The tablet documents the completion by Tukulti-Ninurta I of the
temple of Ishtar of Nineveh at Assur, which was begun by his father Shalmaneser I. The temple itself has not
been located, so this tablet and two others found with it are the only records of its existence. Email from
Prof. John Russell to author (Nov. 25, 2013) (on file with author).
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New York. At the time of the estate's accounting, a son of the decedent notified the
museum of the tablet's location. The museum then filed a claim in Surrogate's Court in
Nassau County to recover the tablet. The estate defended against the museum's claim,
arguing that the museum was barred under New York State's doctrine of laches and that
the decedent might have acquired good title to the tablet as a "spoil of war." 3
While New York courts follow the "demand and refisal" rule, which holds that a cause
of action for the recovery of stolen property accrues (thus triggering the running of the
statute of limitations time period) only after the original owner demands return of the
stolen property from a good faith possessor and the possessor refuises, 4 a claim may be
barred through the equitable defense of laches.5 Because claims involving recovery of
stolen art and other cultural objects are generally litigated in federal court based on diver-
sity jurisdiction, the New York courts have spoken infrequently on the elements of a laches
defense and their application to specific cases. This case, however, presented an opportu
nity for the New York Court of Appeals to articulate how the defense of laches should
apply.
The Surrogate's Court held that the museum's claim should be barred by laches, based
on the museum's failure to report the tablet's disappearance to authorities or to record its
theft on international registries of stolen art. The Surrogate's Court found that this lack
of activity on the museum's part prejudiced the estate's ability to defend against the mu-
seum's claim.6 The Appellate Division reversed the Surrogate's Court, holding that the
estate, which had the burden to prove the elements of its affirmative defense, failed to
establish that the museum had acted unreasonably or that the estate suffered legal
prejudice.7 On further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division's decision.
The significant aspect of the Court of Appeal's decision focused on the two prongs of
the laches defense-that the claimant delayed unreasonably and that the defendant estab-
lished that the unreasonable delay caused prejudice to the defendant. In this case, the
court held that the estate failed to prove that the museum's failure to publicize the loss of
the tablet and any delay on the part of the museum resulted in the museum's failure to
discover that the decedent possessed the tablet before his death.8 The estate also failed to
establish that it suffered any prejudice due to the museum's alleged delay.9
In discussing the question of prejudice, the court focused on whether there was any
legal theory by which Flamenbaum might have acquired good title to the tablet, an admit-
tedly stolen object. The estate relied on a theory of "spoils of war" according to which a
Russian soldier or the Russian government might have acquired title to the tablet through
conquest and as a "spoil of war." In addition to the fact that the estate offered no proof
3. In re Flamenbaum, 22 N.Y.3d 962, 964-65 (2013).
4. See Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); Menzel v. List, 267
N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified by 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).
5. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 819 F. Supp. 2d 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), affd, 500 Fed. App'x 6 (2d Cir. 2012);
Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991); In re Peters, 821 N.Y.S.2d 61
(App. Div. 1st Dep't 2006); Wertheimer v. Cirker's Hayes Storage Warehouse, 752 N.Y.S.2d 295 (App. Div.
2002).
6. In re Flamenhaum, 899 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54.
7. Id.
8. In re Flamenhaum, 22 N.Y.3d 962, 965-66 (2013).
9. Id. at 966.
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for such a theory, the Court of Appeals squarely rejected the notion that the decedent
could have acquired title in this way, stating that "we decline to adopt any doctrine that
would establish good title based upon the looting and removal of cultural objects during
wartime by a conquering military force .... Allowing the [e]state to retain the tablet
based on a spoils of war doctrine would be findamentally unjust." 1
This decision is significant for two reasons. First, it clearly establishes that the laches
defense is not based merely on a claimant's alleged unreasonable delay. Even if the claim-
ant has delayed, the defendant must prove that the delay caused legal prejudice and pre-
vented the defendant from proving a defense.I Second, the court provided a clear
rejection of a "spoils of war" doctrine that would permit acquisition of title to stolen
property. The United States has rejected the idea that legitimate war booty includes
artworks and cultural objects since 1863 when the Lieber Code was adopted for the U.S.
Army during the Civil War.' 2 The international community has also rejected such a no-
tion since the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, to which all nations involved in World
War II were and still are States Parties.' 3 It is also worth noting that the Court of Ap-
peals, however, did not limit its rejection of a "spoils of war" doctrine to World War II,
and so it may remain to fiture claims to determine whether such rejection applies to
cultural objects taken during earlier wars and conflicts.
II. The Fair Use Defense: Cariou v. Prince
Litigation between the artists Patrick Cariou and Richard Prince has raised, again,
questions of the definition of the fair use defense in a copyright infringement case and, in
particular, the meaning of the transformative use element of the defense. In 2000, pho-
tographer Patrick Cariou published a book titled Yes, Rasta, which contained photographs
taken in Jamaica by Cariou over a six-year period. 4 The book contained photographs of
Rastafarians, other individuals, and landscapes in Jamaica. 5 After its publication, artist
Richard Prince obtained a copy of Yes, Rasta.
From approximately December 2007 through February 2008, Prince exhibited artwork
in St. Barths, including a collage titled Canal Zone, which contained thirty-five photo-
graphs torn from a copy of Yes, Rasta. 16 Canal Zone was not sold, but Prince did sell other
10. Id.
11. Prejudice can be either evidence-based or expectations-based. As the First Circuit in Vineberg v. Bis-
sonnette stated, "[t]ypically, the kind of prejudice that will support a laches defense arises out of a loss of
evidence, the unavailability of important witnesses, the conveyance of the property in dispute for fair market
value to a bona fide purchaser, or the expenditure of resources in reliance upon the status quo ante."
Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2008).
12. FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN
THE FIELD 36 (1898) ("[i]n no case shall they [works of art, libraries, collections] be sold or given away, if
captured by the armies of the United States, nor shall they ever be privately appropriated, or wantonly de-
stroyed or injured").
13. Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 56 (Oct. 18, 1907) 36 Stat.
2277, T.S. No. 539, availahie at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20thcentury/hagueO4.asp ("[a]ll seizure of, de-
struction or wilful [sic] damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and
science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings").
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works of art from that exhibit through the Gagosian Gallery, Inc. (the Gagosian Gal-
lery). 1 Prince eventually created twenty-nine collages and paintings in a series titled Ca-
nal Zone and twenty-eight of those works contained images from Yes, Rasta (the Works).18
In November and December 2008, Prince exhibited twenty-two of the Works in the
Gagosian Gallery, which also published a catalog that included images of many of the
Works.19
Cariou sold a limited number of photographs to people he knew, but otherwise he had
not sold or licensed any of the photographs from Yes, Rasta.2 0 Cariou did negotiate with a
gallery owner named Christiane Celle to exhibit photographs from Yes, Rasta in her New
York gallery (the Celle Gallery)21 When Celle became aware of Prince's show at the
Gagosian Gallery, she cancelled the show at the Celle Gallery.22 Cariou filed a petition
alleging copyright infringement against Prince, the Gagosian Galley, Larry Gagosian, and
Rizzoli International Publications, Inc. Prince, the Gagosian Gallery, and Gagosian (col-
lectively the Defendants) asserted the defense of fair use.
On March 18, 2011, the federal district court granted Cariou's motion for summary
judgment.2 3 The district court held that (1) the transformative use element weighed heav-
ily against a finding of fair use; (2) Prince's use and exploitation of the photographs were
substantially commercial; (3) Defendants acted in bad faith; (4) the nature of the work
factor weighed against a finding of fair use; (5) the factor of amount and substantiality of
the portion used weighed heavily against a finding of fair use; (6) the factor of effect of use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work weighed against a finding
of fair use; and (7) the Gagosian Gallery and Gagosian were liable as direct, vicarious, and
contributory infringers.24
The district court permanently enjoined the Defendants from any further copyright
infringement.25 It gave the Defendants ten days to deliver to Cariou the works and associ-
ated materials to be destroyed or disposed of as Cariou saw fit.26 Finally, the district court
ordered the Defendants to notify all current and future purchasers of the works that they
infringe on Cariou's copyrights, were not made legally, and cannot be lawfully displayed27
The Defendants appealed.
On April 25, 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in part, va-
cated in part, and remanded the action to the district court.2 8 The Defendants contended
that Prince's work was transformative and constituted fair use.2 9 The Defendants argued
that the district court erred by requiring that, in order to rely on the defense of fair use,
the works must comment on Cariou, his work, or an aspect of popular culture associated
17. Id.
18. Id. at 344.




23. Id. at 355.
24. Id. at 337.
25. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 355.
26. Id. at 355-56.
27. Id. at 356.
28. Cation v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
29. Id. at 698.
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with Cation or his work.30 The Court of Appeals ruled that the fair use defense included
no such comment requirement and that twenty-five of the works were protected as a mat-
ter of law by fair use.3 1
The Court of Appeals concluded that those twenty-five works "have a different charac-
ter, give Cariou's photographs a new expression, and employ new aesthetics with creative
and communicative results distinct from Cariou's." 32 The Court of Appeals clarified that
this conclusion should not be taken to suggest that any cosmetic changes to Cariou's pho-
tographs would necessarily constitute fair use, as a subsequent work may modify the origi-
nal without being transformative. 33 The Court of Appeals determined that, in those
twenty-five works, Prince did not present the same material as Cariou in a different man-
ner; instead, he added something new to them "and presented images with a fundamen-
tally different aesthetic." 34 As those twenty-five works were found not to infringe
Cariou's copyrights, the Court of Appeals found that Gagosian and Gagosian Gallery
could not be held liable as vicarious or contributory infringers. 3
The Court of Appeals remanded to the district court the issue of the five remaining
works for the district court to determine whether any of them infringed on Cariou's copy-
rights and whether they were entitled to the defense of fair use.36 The Court of Appeals
expressed no view as to whether those five works are entitled to the defense of fair use.37
Cariou filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. On Novem-
ber 12, 2013, that petition was denied. 38
III. The Act of State Doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary and Konowaloff v. Metropolitan
Museum of Art
Two cases reviewed by appellate courts in late 2012 and early 2013 shared the act of
State doctrine and its application as a common defense. In Konowaloff v. Metropolitan Mu-
seum ofArt, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court and permitted the defendant to
rely on the act of State doctrine.39 But, in de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, the D.C. Cir-
cuit affirmed a district court decision that rejected defenses based on the act of State
doctrine and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).40
The act of State doctrine prohibits U.S. courts from examining
the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign
government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence
30. Id.
31. Id. at 698-99.
32. Id. at 707-08.
33. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707-08.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 712.
36. Id.
37. Id. The district court mistakenly referred to twenty-nine works when, in fact, there were thirty.
38. Cation v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).
39. Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum of Art, 702 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2012), aJfg No. 10-CV-09126, 2011
WL 4430856, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011).
40. De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles,
even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.4 1
This also applies if the taking violates the foreign State's own law. Act of State issues
arise only "when the outcome of the case turns upon the effect of official action by a
foreign sovereign." 42
In Konowaloff, the plaintiff was "the sole heir to the estate of his great-grandfather, Ivan
Morozov," who had a modern art collection that allegedly "ranked 'among the finest in
Europe"' prior to World War .4 3 In 1911, Morozov acquired the subject painting by Paul
Cezanne, Madame Cezanne in the Conservatory (the Painting).44 Following the Russian
Revolution in March 1917, power was seized by the Bolshevik regime and its successor the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (collectively referred to as the Soviet Government),
which were not recognized by the United States until November 193 3.45 In December
1918, the Bolsheviks decreed Morozov's collection, including the Painting, to be the
property of the State, which plaintiff alleged was an act of theft. 46 The amended com-
plaint further alleged that the Painting was acquired illegally in 1933 by Stephen Clark
(who eventually donated it to the Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1960) when he pur-
chased it from Knoedler, one of the galleries representing the Soviet Government in the
sale of art.4r In sum, the plaintiff alleged that both the acquisition of the Painting by the
Bolsheviks in 1918 and the subsequent sale to Stephen Clark violated Russian law and
were both characterized as an "act of party, not an act of [S]tate." 4s
The Second Circuit held that the act of State doctrine was a bar to plaintiff's case and
upheld the dismissal by the district court.49 In doing so, the court reasoned that, "[tWirst,
the characterization of the Soviet government's appropriation as 'an act of theft' is a legal
assertion, which the court was not required to accept" and "[s] econd, the lawfilness of the
Soviet government's taking of the Painting is precisely what the act of state doctrine bars
the [U.S.] courts from determining."50 Additionally, the court rejected any consideration
of the 193 3 sale stating that the relevant act of State was the 1918 appropriation by the
Soviet Government, upon which "Morozov was deprived of all his property rights and
interests in the Painting."5I Finally, the court held that even though "the current Russian
government is apparently disinclined to engage in further appropriations of private prop-
erty and has initiated an investigation into the 1930s art sales ... it has not repudiated the
1918 appropriation that is the government act that deprived Morozov, and hence Ko-
nowaloff, of any right to the Painting."5 2
41. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); see also Republic of Austria v. Alt-
mann, 541 U.S. 677, 713 (2004).
42. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 406 (1990).
43. Konowaloff, 702 F.3d at 141.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 141-42.
46. Id. at 142.
47. Id. at 143-44.
48. Konowaloff, 702 F.3d at 143-44.
49. Id. at 148.
50. Id. at 147 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 148.
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De Csepel involves the Herzog Collection, assembled by Baron Mor Lipot Herzog and
said to have been the largest pre-World War II art collection in Hungary, comprising
more than two thousand paintings, sculptures, and other artworks. 53 The Nazis allegedly
seized large portions of the collection for eventual transport to Germany. 54 In the subject
litigation, heirs of the Herzog family sought the return of at least forty works of art from
the original collection that plaintiffs allege had been handed over by the Hungarian gov-
emnment to the Museum of Fine Arts for "safekeeping" and were eventually displayed in
several institutions in Budapest, all named defendants. 55
Plaintiffs asserted a primary claim for breach of bailment agreements as well as claims
for "conversion, constructive trust, accounting, declaratory relief, and restitution based on
unjust enrichment." 56 Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that the district court
lacked jurisdiction under the FSIA, the complaint failed to state a claim for bailment, and
the claims were barred by the act of State doctrine as well as by the applicable statute of
limitations, the political question doctrine, and the doctrines of foreign non conveniens and
international comity. 57 In most respects, the district court denied the defendants' motion
to dismiss, including, among other reasons, the act of State doctrine. 58
The court expended little time on the act of State doctrine and its application to these
facts, correctly holding that the doctrine did not apply. Critical to its determination was
the fact that plaintiffs were seeking "to recover from breaches of bailment agreements,"
which were "not sovereign acts, but rather commercial acts entitled to no deference under
the act of [S]tate doctrine." 59 The court reiterated the rule that the doctrine "applies only
to conduct that is by nature distinctly sovereign, i.e., conduct that cannot be undertaken
by a private individual or entity."60
The D.C. Court of Appeals also affirmed the district court's decision finding that the
FSIA did not apply to defendants. The FSIA prohibits U.S. courts from exercising juris-
diction over foreign States.6 1 The Herzog heirs argued that the FSIA abrogated sovereign
immunity based on the "expropriation" exception and, in the alternative, the "commercial
activity" exception within the statute. 62
The district court abrogated Hungary's sovereign immunity under the FSIA by relying
on the expropriation exception, which states that a U.S. court has jurisdiction over a for-
eign nation where "rights in property taken in violation of international law are at issue." 63
But the appellate court declined to rule on the application of the expropriation exception.
Rather, it emphasized plaintiffs' claims that bailment contracts were created and repudi-
ated after the Hungarian government expropriated the paintings in concert with the Nazis
during World War 11.64 Therefore, the court held that it need only apply the FSIA's
53. De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
54. Id. at 595.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 596.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 596-97.
59. Id. at 604 (quoting De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113, 143 (D.D.C. 2011)).
60. Id. (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Islamric Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2012).
62. De Csepel, 714 F.3d at 597.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).
64. De Csepel, 714 F.3d at 597-600.
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commercial activity exception, which abrogates sovereign immunity where an action is
based on an act that (1) "took place outside the territory of the United States," (2) was
connected with a commercial activity, and (3) had a direct effect on the United States. 65
Discussing the second factor, the court held that defendants' actions were commercial
because they were similar to the type of action in which a private party might engage in
commerce.
66 Pertaining to the third factor, the court decided that there was an effect on
the United States because Hungary promised to return artwork to Herzog heirs it knew
resided in the United States.
67
The appellate court rejected defendants' FSIA arguments based on legal, not factual,
grounds. It remains to be seen whether the heirs of the Herzog family can establish par-
ticular facts supporting the creation and breach of a bailment contract; meanwhile, the fate
of these artworks remains uncertain.
IV. Due Diligence in Art Market Transactions: Davis v. Carroll
Earl Davis (Davis) received, as gifts from his parents, many Smart Davis artworks, in-
cluding eight works that were the subject of this lawsuit (the disputed works).68 Davis
consigned the disputed works, along with many others, to Salander O'Reilly Gallery (the
gallery), owned by Larry Salander (Salander). Davis and Salander had an oral agreement
that included an understanding that the gallery would contact Davis for an updated pric-
ing before selling any artwork or indicating an asking price. Davis did not file any U.C.C.
financing statements to publicize his consignment interest in works delivered to the
gallery.
In late 2005, two Stuart Davis works sold for record amounts at Christie's and
Sotheby's. Thereafter, Davis and Salander had a disagreement, and Davis told Salander
"to suspend all sales pending [Salander's] return of the works to [Davis] before [they] had
any firther discussion between him and [Davis]. ' 69 Salander agreed to suspend sales, re-
turn Davis's artworks, and pay Davis for the artwork already sold. Starting in January
2006 and continuing through the next two years, Davis regularly pressured Salander to
return all of the works that Davis had placed on consignment. Salander kept promising to
do so but always found an excuse to delay.
Davis was unaware that the gallery was caught in a web of unethical and illegal dealings
that ultimately resulted in Salander's criminal conviction. Before the gallery collapsed,
Salander engaged in a series of major transactions with Joseph P. Carroll (Carroll), a pri-
vate art dealer. Over four months in 2006, Salander purported to sell, through a series of
exchanges (2006 Exchanges), forty-four artworks to Carroll-including fifteen Stuart Da-
vis works, eight of which are the disputed works in this case.
In 2009, Davis filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York to recover the disputed works from Carroll, arguing that Carroll should have been
alerted to signs of foul play and that Carroll's due diligence reflected commercial indiffer-
65. Id. at 598 (quoting Rong v. Liaoning Province Gov't, 452 F.3d 883, 888-89 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
66. Id. at 599 (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992)).
67. Id. at 601.
68. Davis v. Carroll, 937 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
69. Id. at 398.
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ence to Davis' legal rights. Carroll asserted he had every reason to trust the gallery and
that his due diligence was more than adequate. Davis then moved for summary judgment.
This case involved the application of the "entrustment doctrine," codified in Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code.70 Entrustment applies when an owner of property trans-
fers possession to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind, and the merchant then
transfers the property to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. In such cases, the
merchant can transfer all rights that the entruster had in the property. In this case, Car-
roll argued that he had acquired title under the entrustment doctrine by purchasing from
Salandar, an art dealer. This case addresses the question of what is the standard of good
faith that a purchaser, particularly an art merchant, must display in order to claim status as
a buyer in the ordinary course of business.
The court stated that New York law requires a heightened duty of due diligence where a
purchaser is presented with reason to suspect foul play in a sale.71 This objective inquiry
focuses on whether a sale was transacted in the shadow of red flags that should have put
the purchaser on notice of potential illegality. Davis identified a number of such warning
signs, such as evidence of the Gallery's financial difficulties, mixed signals regarding the
Gallery's right to convey valid title to the disputed works, and "bargain basement"
pricing.72
The court found that, even read in the light most favorable to Carroll, the record dic-
tated a finding of important red flags. The single most important red flag under New
York law consists of indications that the seller neither owns the work nor enjoys authority
to sell it. In this case, the court found that "it is beyond doubt that Carroll should have
been alerted by numerous signs to serious questions about" the gallery's authority to sell
the disputed works.73 In support of this conclusion, the court cited Carroll's indifference
to provenance statements for many of the works that simply listed "Estate of the Owner"
or citations in the cataloguing for the works to publications that listed Davis as the
owner.
74
The court noted that "it is a basic duty of any purchaser of an object d'art to examine
the provenance for that piece, and Carroll repeatedly affirms that he filfilled that duty."75
The record showed that none of the documentation associated with the transfer of the
works listed the Gallery as the owner, and Salander never told Carroll that he or the
gallery did, in fact, own the works. Carroll could point to no document that listed the
gallery as the owner. "To the contrary, the documents all listed 'Estate of the Artist' as the
provenance, in contrast to the documentation for several other works involved in the same
set of exchanges that identified Salander, [the gallery], or Salander's wife as the owner."76
The court concluded that "even crediting Carroll and reading the facts in a light that
flatters him, any reasonable juror would conclude that the 2006 Exchanges raised a signifi-
cant red flag that should have placed Carroll on notice of the need for firther inquiry."' 77
70. N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 403(2)-(3).
71. Davis, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 428.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 429.
76. Id.
77. Davis, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
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"New York law also identifies bargain basement prices as a critically important red flag
in art transactions. That red flag was clearly present during the 2006 Exchanges, as sepa-
rately evidenced by the fact that (1) Carroll valued these works at markedly higher prices
shortly after acquiring them and (2) there was a significant discrepancy between the prices
that Carroll paid in May 2006 and an expert's fair market value appraisal."7s
"The 2006 Exchanges began when Salander called Carroll and mentioned an end of
year 90 percent off sale. Carroll claim[ed] that he interpreted this comment as a joke, but
the subsequent course of dealings between him and Salander casts it in a very different
light."79 The court found that "the total value exchanged in the 2006 Exchanges, account-
ing for fair market appraisals and the substantial discounts common to [the art market],
should have alerted any savvy market participant to foul play."8O "This conclusion [was]
independently supported by a comparison of Carroll's payment for the fifteen Davis works
($1,445,000) and [an independent] appraisal of the fair market value of those works at the
time of the 2006 Exchanges ($4,595,000)." The court stated, "[i]n other words, Carroll
received a 68.55 percent discount from fair market value .... The prices afforded to
Carroll would have put any reasonable market participant on notice of foul play."8I
The court decided that a reasonable juror would conclude that Carroll's acquisition of
the disputed works was not "free and clear of cause to suspect improper dealings."82 The
court noted that "bargain basement prices offered by Salander, along with a battery of
irregular and suspicious issues ... pertaining to [the Gallery's] ownership of and right to
sell the eight Disputed Works, constituted red flags that triggered a duty of heightened
inquiry on Carroll's part .... 83 As a result, Carroll was actually or constructively on
notice of the need for 'firther verification' before" acquiring the disputed works, and he
therefore did not qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business.8 4 The court there-
fore granted Davis's motion for summary judgment. Carroll filed a Notice of Appeal in
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, but, shortly thereafter, the parties filed a
stipulation withdrawing the appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.85
V. Detroit Institute of Arts
After years of financial turmoil, on July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit (the City) filed a
petition for relief-6 under Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the U.S. Code (as amended, the "bank-
ruptcy code").87 In addition to the more typical municipal bankruptcy concerns (the abil-
ity of the City to continue to provide essential services or to meet payroll or pension
obligations), the City's filing has occasioned discussion of the fate of the Detroit Institute
78. Davis, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 432 (citing Brown v. Mitchell-hines & Nash, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
35081, at *20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2009)); see also Interested Lloyd's Underwriters, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2547 1, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2005).
79. Davis, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 434.
82. Davis, 937 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 437 (citing Porter v. Wertz, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254, 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)).
85. Order, Davis v. Carroll, No. 13-2201-cv (2d Cir. Jul. 15, 2013), ECF No. 33.
86. Bankr. Pet. at 1, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich., filedJuly 18, 2013), ECF No. 1.
87. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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of Arts (the DIA). "As Detroit files for bankruptcy," the New York Times reported, the day
after the city's filing, that "the impressive collection of the Detroit Institute of Arts has
become a political bargaining chip in a fight that could drag on for years between the city
and its army of creditors, who have said in no uncertain terms that the artworks must be
considered a salable asset."88
The question of the collections' fate arises because of the DIA's unusual structure, in
which title to the collections is held by the City, not by a not-for-profit corporation or
trust. This structure, though, was not always the case. The DIA's predecessor, the De-
troit Museum of Art, was founded as a private, not-for-profit corporation in 1885. As
early as 1893, the museum began receiving supplemental funding from the City.89 In
1915, however, the Michigan Supreme Court held that, even though the museum had
conveyed its buildings to the City and given the City minority representation on the mu-
seum's board, such appropriations violated the state constitution's restrictions on the lend-
ing of credit by the City to an entity other than a public or municipal agency. 90
In response, in 1919, the Michigan legislature amended the Corporations for the Culti-
vation of Art statute9' to provide that not-for-profit cultural or educational corporations
could convey their property to the state or municipalities. The Detroit Museum of Art
conveyed its collections to the City. Subsequently, the legislature authorized the city to
once again appropriate monies to support the museum, newly christened the "Detroit
Institute of Arts" (DIN).92
In the intervening ninety-four years, the DIA has emerged as one of the country's finest
encyclopedic art museums. Its holdings include The Wedding Dance (ca. 1566) by Pieter
Bruegel the Elder, Self Portrait (1887) by Vincent Van Gogh, The Dreams of Man (1550) by
Tintoretto, The Visitation (1640) by Rembrandt, Cotopaxi (1862) by Frederic Church, The
Window (1916) by Henri Matisse, Orange Brown (1963) by Mark Rothko, Saint Jerome in
His Study (ca. 1440) by Jan van Eyck, Selene and Endymion (ca. 1628) by Nicolas Poussin,
Double Self Portrait (1967) by Andy Warhol, and the Diego Rivera murals.
In the City's bankruptcy case, the critical questions for the fiture of the DIA and its
collections are (1) "[c] an all or part of the DIN's collections be leveraged or monetized and
the proceeds be used to pay the city's debt unrelated to the DIA and its operations" and
(2) "[clan the city's creditors compel the sale of some or all of the DIA's collections?" The
brief answer to the first question is a qualified "yes." The brief answer to the second
question is a qualified "no."
Under the bankruptcy code, a debtor's ownership of or interest in property is deter-
mined under state law. As a result, the DIA's structure, its relation to the City, the man-
ner in which the collections were acquired, and any restrictions attached to particular
works are all essential facts. In an opinion issued June 13, 2013, Michigan's attorney
general concluded that the DIA's collections could not be "sold, conveyed, or transferred
88. Randy Kennedy & Monica Davey, Deroits Creditors Eye ItsArt Collection, N.Y. TimEs (Jnly 20, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/arts/design/detroits-creditors-eye-its-art-collection.html.
89. Detroit Institute ofArt's Ballot Initiative, D BUSINESS (July 9, 2012), http://www.dbusiness.com/DBusi-
ness/July-Anlgust-2012/Detroit-Institute-of-Arts-Ballot-Initiative.
90. Detroit Museum of Art v. Engel, 153 N.W. 700, 703 (Mich. 1915).
91. See 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts 2, as amended by 1913 Mich. Pub. Acts 446.
92. Mark Stryker, DiA in Peril. A Look at the Museum's Long, Tangled Relationship with Detroit Politics and
Finances, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.freep.com/article/20130908/ENT05/130905007.
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to satisfy City debts or obligations. ' 93 In the Attorney General's view, when the City
acquired the collections of the Detroit Museum of Arts (which held the collections in a
public trust), the City accepted the trust obligation. That trust's purpose was then as-
sumed by the City through the DIA and continues to attach to all subsequent acquisitions.
However, the attorney general's opinion is not dispositive and has not been accepted by
the City's Emergency Manager and other parties in interest. The City's Emergency Man-
ager engaged Christie's to review and appraise certain portions of the DIA collections that
the City believes are unrestricted and available to be monetized.
9 4
The answer to the second question-whether the City's creditors can compel the sale of
the DIN's collectionsturns on the more limited role and authority that a municipal
debtor's creditors have in a Chapter 995 case than creditors of a corporate or individual
debtor would have in more common Chapter 796 (liquidation) or Chapter 1197 (reorgani-
zation) cases. In Chapter 9 cases, creditors have fewer options available to them than they
do in cases where a debtor is not a municipality. In Chapter 9, for instance, creditors
cannot propose a competing plan (only the municipal debtor may propose a plan), they
cannot convert the debtor's case to a case under Chapter 7, they cannot have a trustee
appointed, and they cannot force the sale of municipal assets under state law. Where the
City's creditors do have bargaining power is in their right and ability to vote on confirma-
tion of any plan of adjustment that the city will propose.
A Chapter 9 debtor restrucnires its debts by proposing and confirming a plan of adjust-
ment. Importantly, that plan allows the debtor to non-consensually modify its contractual
obligations. 98 This enables the debtor to assume those contracts that are beneficial and to
reject those that are burdensome. So, while a creditor cannot force the City to sell any
DIA artworks, it can vote against any plan the city proposes that modifies the creditor's
pre-bankruptcy contractual rights. The City's creditors cannot dictate the process, but
they are parties at the table.
93. Conveyance or Transfer of Detroit Institute of Arts Collection, Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 7272 (June
13, 2013).
94. Corey Williams, Christie's Check of Detroit's Art Done in October, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 4, 2013),
available at http://news.yahoo.com/christies-check-detroits-art-done-132922465.html; see also Sherri Welch,
Not All Gifts to DIA Were Donated with Strings Attached, CHAIN'S DETROIT BUSINESS (May 30, 2013), http://
www.crainsdetroit.com/print/article/20130529/BLOG009/130529862/not-all-gifts-to-dia-were-donated-
with-strings-attached.html.
95. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (2012) (Adjustment of Debts of a Municipality). Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code provides for reorganization of the debts of municipalities (which includes cities and towns, as well as
villages, counties, taxing districts, municipal utilities, and school districts). A Chapter 9 debtor proposes a
plan of adjustment of its debts, which allows the municipality to modify existing contractual obligations.
96. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-84 (2012) (Liquidation). Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for "liqui-
dation," (i.e., the sale of a debtor's nonexempt property and the distribution of the proceeds to creditors).
Upon distribution of such proceeds, the debtor receives a discharge of its obligations to creditors. To qualify
for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor may be an individual, a partnership, or a
corporation or other business entity.
97. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2012) (Reorganization). Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code generally
provides for providing for reorganization. Typically, a debtor in a Chapter 11 case is a corporation or part-
nership. But individuals may also seek relief under Chapter 11. A Chapter 11 debtor usually proposes a plan
of reorganization to keep its business alive and pay creditors over time, and receives a discharge of obligations
other than as provided for under the plan of reorganization.
98. In re Jefferson Cty., 465 B.R. 243, 293 n.21 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2012).
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Although the City's bankruptcy case will likely not reach any final resolution for many
months, perhaps years, it is possible to outline several potential outcomes as they relate to
the future of the DIA collections. The Attorney General's broad exemption of the DIA
collections from sale or monetization is unlikely to be upheld. That means that the City
will need to find a way to utilize the value of the DIN's collections in order to reach a
feasible and confirmable plan of adjustment.9 9 Short-term and long-term loans of certain
of the DIA's artworks, the pledging of certain artworks as collateral for loans to the City,
and the de-accessioning and sale of certain artworks will all be considered. Recent discus-
sions have focused on finding what the federal judge appointed by the bankruptcy court to
lead a mediation team has described as "a creative solution." Under this "creative solu-
tion," nine foundations "including Kresge, Hudson-Webber, Mott, Knight and the Ford
Foundation of New York... [would] create a private fund to do two things: help the city
honor pension commitments to its public-sector employees and protect the DIA and its
valuable pieces from liquidation." In exchange, "the DIA and its assets . . . would be
conveyed to a nonprofit charitable trust to ensure they never are imperiled again." 1
Whether or not this fund proposal moves forward, it is clear that the ultimate resolution
will be a negotiated resolution, and it will likely include a significant political component.
99. The valuation and plan treatment of the DIA's collections are likely to be sharp points of contention as
the city's plan process moves forward. Creditors will want to expand their role in the decision-making re-
garding the DIA's future. On November 26, 2013, an ad hoc group of creditors filed a motion asking the
bankruptcy court to appoint a committee of creditors and interested persons to meet with the city "to assess
the value of the [DIA's collections] based on arms-length market transactions that are consistent with recoin-
mendations regarding value-maximizing strategies made by and subject to consultation with a leading art
intermediary or intermediaries. This collaborative process will enable the city and creditors to explore a wide
range of options to monetize the [DIA's collections], including options that preserve the DIA as a culturally
relevant institution as well as enhance creditor recoveries, in order to reach a consensus about the treatment
of the [DIA's collections] under the plan." Motion of Creditors for Entry of an Order Pursuant to Section
105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code Appointing and Directing the Debtor to Cooperate with a Committee of
Creditors and Interested Persons to Assess the Art Collection of the Detroit Institute of Arts Based on Arms-
Length Market Transactions to Establish a Benchmark Valuation at 3, In re City of Detroit, No. 13-53846
(Bankr. E.D. Mich., filed Nov. 26, 2013), ECF No. 1833, available at http://www.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/
C42156391126.PDF.
100. Daniel Howes et. al, Donors Pitched to Aid DIA, Pensions, DETROIT NEWS (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.
detroitnews.com/article/20131114/METRO01/311140048.
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